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Abstract 
The Australian Constitution lays down a process for creating new states out of 
the existing states that form the Australian Federation. This article explores that 
process, in historical and political perspective. It examines the drafting of the 
relevant provisions of the Constitution, and legal uncertainties that arise from 
them, including as to what terms and conditions might be imposed by the 
Commonwealth, and whether a referendum is required to create a new state in 
this way. The article then examines attempts to bring about new states from 
Australia’s existing states, before considering proposals for constitutional 
reform. It demonstrates how an apparently dynamic set of constitutional 
provisions have given rise to a static Federation in which there is no realistic 
prospect that a new state will be formed out of an existing state in the near 
future. The article suggests, however, that in the longer term there is a better 
prospect that new states will be formed from existing states if proposals for 
constitutional reform are adopted. 
I Introduction 
The Australian states have taken on a rigid and unchanging character. Although the 
Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory were created, respectively, 
out of New South Wales in 1910,1 and South Australia in 1911,2 state boundaries 
have otherwise remained unchanged since Federation in 1901, and no new state 
has been added to the list.3 Yet, contrary to assumptions of stasis, the constitutional 
process for creating new states out of existing states is relatively straightforward 
and, for the most part, conducive to an evolving federal system. This is reflected in 
the fact that, following Federation, significant progress was made towards the 
creation of a new state in northern New South Wales, and there were ambitious 
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new state movements in the Riverina and the Monaro in southern New South 
Wales, and in Queensland. 
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the creation of new states out 
of the existing Australian states. In part, this has stemmed from preparations for the 
Reform of the Federation White Paper, set to be released in late 2015. The White 
Paper will be the culmination of a wide-ranging review directed to clarifying the 
roles and responsibilities of Commonwealth, state and territory governments. Its 
objectives include building ‘a more efficient and effective federation’.4 
This renewed interest is also reflected in the statements of Australian 
politicians. In 2014, Barnaby Joyce, the Federal Minister for Agriculture and the 
Member for New England, sought support for the formation of a new state in 
northern New South Wales. Recalling the defeat of a referendum on the question 
of a new state in northern New South Wales in 1967, he highlighted ongoing 
concern that decisions made in Sydney were often not in the best interests of rural 
communities. Noting the large geographical area that the Australian states 
comprise and the arbitrariness of their boundaries, Joyce did not consider ‘in their 
maddest dreams … the founders of our federation would have believed that our 
progression to new states had stopped for eternity in 1901’.5 In making such 
statements, Joyce continues a tradition of Country Party and later National Party 
support for new states.6 Bob Katter, Federal Member for Kennedy, has also 
advocated the formation of new states in the north of Australia.7 Similarly, Clive 
Palmer, Federal Member for Fairfax, has supported the creation of a new state in 
northern Queensland.8 
Support for the creation of new states has also come from other quarters. 
Historian Geoffrey Blainey suggested that for a country the size of Australia ‘we 
do not possess enough States’, and that each major region could form the basis of a 
state government.9 Academic and barrister Bryan Pape also put forward a federalist 
argument for the creation of new states, contending that this would foster growth 
outside existing state capitals, rebalance the allocation of power between different 
levels of government, increase public participation in democratic processes and 
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operate as a check on abuses of government power.10 Accordingly, he advocated 
the division of Australia into 20 states, each with its own government and about 40 
Members of Parliament, and with Senate representation.11 Pape called for a royal 
commission or other inquiry to consider the potential boundaries of new states,12 
and envisaged the division of New South Wales into five states; the division of 
Queensland into three states; the division of Victoria, South Australia and Western 
Australia each into several states; and the creation of a state in the Northern 
Territory.13 
The constitutional provisions concerning new states have been considered 
in connection with the question of Northern Territory statehood.14 These issues 
have also been analysed in the context of federal theory, and by way of proposing 
and assessing new models of federal reform.15 The focus of this article is different, 
and more specific. It examines the constitutional requirements for the creation of 
new states from the existing Australian states, in historical and political 
perspective. It explores the drafting of the relevant constitutional provisions in the 
1890s and the attempts to apply them to create new states since Federation. These 
are matters that have received little recent attention. The recent rise in interest in 
the area invites a fresh examination. 
Part II of this article surveys the debates from the constitutional conventions 
of the 1890s, suggesting that the framers of the Constitution contemplated the 
formation of new states as part of the development of the Australian system of 
government, particularly in Queensland. Part III outlines the process for creating 
new states after Federation in 1901 under the ch VI of the Constitution and 
examines uncertainties surrounding these provisions. Part IV then reviews the 
history of attempts to create new states out of the existing states since Federation, 
with a focus on the movement for a new state in New England, which led to three 
royal commissions and a defeated referendum. Part V analyses the 
recommendations of the three Commonwealth reviews that examined the new 
states provisions and suggests a basis for future constitutional reform. 
Ultimately, this article contends that the Constitution is permissive of 
dynamism, insofar as it provides for the creation of new states out of existing 
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states, if the consent of the Commonwealth Parliament and the relevant state 
parliament are attained. Political obstacles to the attainment of that consent have, 
however, proved to be insurmountable. Constitutional amendment could address 
this problem by enabling popular support for the change, manifested at a 
referendum, to be an alternative to gaining state parliament consent. 
II Drafting of the New States Provisions 
At the Australasian Federation Conference of 1890 and the National Australasian 
Conventions of 1891 and 1897–98, delegates anticipated the formation of new 
Australian states after Federation and determined a process by which this could 
occur. Attention was paid particularly to the idea that a new state would emerge 
from the area constituting the colony of Queensland. The issue also arose in the 
context of debating other concerns, such as state representation in the 
Commonwealth Parliament and the imperative of ensuring all of the existing 
colonies joined the Commonwealth at Federation. Delegates’ concern with a 
mechanism for the creation of new states was informed by the history of separation 
movements in the colonies since the mid-19th century. 
A Australasian Federation Conference, 1890 
The view that new states would be formed from existing states in an Australian 
Federation was evident at the Australasian Federation Conference held at 
Melbourne in 1890. This initial meeting, attended by representatives of the 
colonies, aimed to ‘test … the feeling of the Conference as to the time being ripe 
for Federation’.16 Sir Henry Parkes, Premier of New South Wales, prompted the 
formation of the Conference and served as its unofficial leader.17 In his first 
substantive address to the Conference, he quoted the 1857 Select Committee of the 
Victorian Legislative Assembly, stating that a federal legislature would ‘possess 
the power of more promptly calling new states into existence throughout their 
immense territory, as the spread of population required it’.18 Parkes’ inclusion of 
new states in his vision of Federation suggests that, from the early stages of the 
formal federal movement, the creation of new states was seen by many as a natural 
step in the development of an Australian Federation. 
Delegates also highlighted the desirability of the federal legislature having 
the power to create new states in the interests of improving governance. John 
Macrossan, Colonial Secretary and Member of the Queensland Legislative 
Assembly, argued that power should be given to the Federal Parliament to 
cut up, if thought necessary, the different existing colonies of Australia, and 
form them into smaller states … [because] the colonies of Australia are too 
large for good government. Some of the existing colonies, such as 
																																																								
16 Official Record of the Proceedings and Debates of the Australasian Federation Conference, 
Melbourne, 6 February 1890, 15 (Sir Henry Parkes). 
17 John M Williams, The Australian Constitution: A Documentary History (Melbourne University 
Press, 2005) 23. 
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Queensland, South Australia, and Western Australia are far too large for 
good government.19 
He argued that the Federal Parliament ought to have such a power just as the 
‘Federal Government of America has cut up the larger states into smaller states 
when it has been deemed expedient and just to do so’.20 Hence, at least some 
delegates expected that new states would be formed from large Australian states. In 
Macrossan’s case, his opinions were based upon his strong support for the 
separatist movement in Queensland.21 
B National Australasian Convention, 1891 
Following the consensus reached in Melbourne that the colonies should federate,22 
discussion of new states continued, although with less prominence, at the National 
Australasian Convention held at Sydney in 1891. Initially, delegates debated a 
series of resolutions proposed by Parkes. In response to Parkes’ first resolution 
‘[t]hat the powers and privileges and territorial rights of the several existing 
colonies shall remain intact’,23 delegates highlighted the need for qualification to 
this principle in order to accommodate new states. They noted not only that the 
Constitution should allow the entry of colonies after Federation,24 but that it should 
also provide for the creation of new states out of the existing states.25 For example, 
in delivering the report of the Convention’s Constitutional Committee, Sir Samuel 
Griffith contemplated the division of Western Australia into two states and 
Queensland into three states, in the context of discussing the representation of new 
states in Commonwealth Parliament.26 
Three provisions governing the creation of new states from existing states 
were included in ch VI of the draft Constitution presented by the Drafting 
Committee.27 Clause 1 provided that any of the existing colonies could be admitted 
to the Commonwealth as a state on its adoption of the Constitution. Clause 2 
empowered the Commonwealth Parliament to establish and admit new states, 
subject to conditions as to parliamentary representation or otherwise, that the 
Commonwealth Parliament may impose. Clause 5 required the consent of the 
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26 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 31 March 1891, 531  
(Sir Samuel Griffith). 
27 Williams, above n 17, 336–7. 
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affected state parliament to the formation of a new state from an existing state.28 
While cls 2 and 5 were not debated, delegates suggested in relation to cl 1 that the 
Commonwealth Parliament should have the power to set the conditions on which 
any colonies joined the Commonwealth after Federation.29 However, this 
discussion was cursory,30 and each provision was accepted without amendment in 
the draft Constitution that emerged from the Convention.31 
As Macrossan advocated during debate,32 the new states provisions in the 
1891 draft Constitution were modelled on similar provisions from the United 
States and Canada. In particular, art IV § 3 of the United States Constitution reads: 
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new 
State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; 
nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of 
States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as 
well as of the Congress.33 
This provided the core elements of the Australian new states provisions: 
that new states from outside of the territory of the Federation may be admitted by 
the federal legislature, and that states may be formed from within the existing 
territory of the Federation with the consent of the federal and state legislatures. The 
additional provision for the admission of the existing colonies in cl 1 reflected the 
influence of s 146 of the Canadian Constitution, which provides for the admission 
of the colonies or provinces of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and British 
Columbia into the Canadian Union.34 
																																																								
28 Ibid 456–7. 
 Chapter VI cl 1: 
Any of the existing Colonies of [name the existing Colonies which have not adopted 
the Constitution] may upon adopting this Constitution be admitted to the 
Commonwealth, and shall thereupon become and be a State of the Commonwealth. 
 Chapter VI cl 2: 
The Parliament of the Commonwealth may from time to time establish and admit to 
the Commonwealth new States, and may upon such establishment and admission 
make and impose such conditions, as to the extent of representation in either House of 
the Parliament or otherwise, as it thinks fit. 
 Chapter VI cl 5: 
A new State shall not be formed by separation of territory from a State without the 
consent of the Parliament thereof, nor shall a State be formed by the union of two or 
more States or parts of States, or the limits of a State be altered, without the consent of 
the Parliament or Parliaments of the State or States concerned. 
29 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 8 April 1891, 883 
(William Smith). 
30 Discussion of ch VI cl 5 occupied less than one page of some 960 pages of the Official Report. 
31 Williams, above n 17, 456–7. 
32 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 13 March 1891, 326 
(John Macrossan). U R Ellis notes that Macrossan would not have supported the adoption of the 
American provision had he foreseen its constraining effect on the formation of new states: Ellis, 
above n 21, 118. 
33 See also John Quick and Robert Randolph Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth (Legal Books, first published 1901, 1995 ed) 967; Joint Committee on 
Constitutional Review, Parliament of Australia, Report from the Joint Committee on Constitutional 
Review (1959) 164 (‘1959 Joint Committee Report’). 
34 Constitution Act 1867 (Imp) 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 146 (‘Constitution Act 1867’). See also Quick and 
Garran, above n 33, 967. 
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C National Australasian Convention, 1897–98 
1 First Session 
The non-attendance of Queensland at the 1897–98 National Australasian 
Convention provided an important context for consideration of the draft new states 
provisions. At this time, the regions of southern Queensland, central Queensland 
and northern Queensland were deeply divided over a range of matters, including 
the desirability of Queensland separating into a number of smaller colonies before 
Federation, or forming a number of states after Federation.35 Members from central 
Queensland and northern Queensland voted against the Federal Enabling Bill, 
which would have empowered representatives from the colony of Queensland to 
attend the National Australasian Convention, as they feared that their interests 
would not be sufficiently advocated by members from southern Queensland.36 It 
was anticipated that members from southern Queensland would have comprised 
the majority of delegates to the Convention.37 
Against this background, debate at the first session held at Adelaide in 1897 
focused on the question of whether conditions should be imposed on the entry of 
colonies into the Commonwealth after Federation. To address concerns that 
allowing colonies to enter the Commonwealth without conditions after Federation 
would discourage colonies from entering the Commonwealth at the time of 
Federation,38 the Convention struck out cl 1 of ch VI and amended cl 2 to read: 
The Parliament may from time to time admit to the Commonwealth any of 
the existing colonies of [name the existing colonies which have not adopted 
the Constitution] and may from time to time establish new States, and may 
upon such admission or establishment make and impose such terms and 
conditions, including the extent of representation in either House of The 
Parliament, as it thinks fit.39 
The language of this provision reflected the anticipation of delegates that new 
states would be created out of the existing states. Hence, the provision provided 
																																																																																																																																
 Section 146: 
It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice of Her Majesty’s Most 
Honourable Privy Council, on Addresses from the Houses of the Parliament of 
Canada, and from the Houses of the respective Legislatures of the Colonies or 
Provinces of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, and British Columbia, to admit 
those Colonies or Provinces, or any of them, into the Union, and on Address from the 
Houses of the Parliament of Canada to admit Rupert’s Land and the North-western 
Territory, or either of them, into the Union, on such Terms and Conditions in each 
Case as are in the Addresses expressed and as the Queen thinks fit to approve, subject 
to the Provisions of this Act; and the Provisions of any Order in Council in that Behalf 
shall have effect as if they had been enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland. 
35 Ellis, above n 21, 114. 
36 Ibid 119. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Adelaide, 20 April 1897, 1007 
(Sir George Turner), 1008 (Alfred Deakin), 1009 (Sir Edward Braddon). 
39 See Williams, above n 17, 608 (emphasis in original). 
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both that Commonwealth Parliament could ‘admit’ an existing colony to the 
Federation, as well as ‘establish’ new states. Edmund Barton, subsequently the first 
Prime Minister of Australia and then a Justice of the High Court, insisted at the 
Convention that both paths to statehood be retained. This reflected his view that in 
most cases new states would be ‘carved out of the limits of the Commonwealth’.40 
2 Second Session 
Delegates did not examine the draft new states provisions at the National Australasian 
Convention session held at Sydney in 1897. However, discussion of a proposed 
covering clause drawing a distinction between ‘Original States’ and ‘New States’ 
prompted consideration of the prospect of new states in Queensland. Throughout this 
debate, the division of Queensland after Federation was used as an example by many 
delegates to support arguments in favour of granting equal parliamentary 
representation only to original states. For example, Henry Higgins, later a Federal 
Attorney-General and Justice of the High Court, voiced the concern that 
the members in the federal parliament for New South Wales, Victoria, and 
the other colonies will be bound to throw their full weight against the 
subdivision of Queensland into two or three states if they find it necessarily 
means six senators to each part of Queensland.41 
Higgins further argued that ‘[t]here is no doubt that in the course of time the 
subdivision of some of these large colonies will be desirable’42 and that delegates 
did not want ‘a subdivision which is a normal and proper one interfered with by 
any rigid clause in this Constitution’.43 The covering clause with its distinction 
between original states and new states was adopted.44 Like Parkes in 1890, the 
framers in 1897 viewed the formation of new states as part of the development of 
Australia, and were reluctant to draft a constitution that would make this difficult 
to achieve. 
3 Third Session 
Consideration of the new states provisions at the final National Australasian 
Convention session held in Melbourne in 1898 was again premised on the 
assumption that new states might be created from Queensland. This informed 
proposed amendments to the provision empowering the Commonwealth 
Parliament to create new states, now numbered as cl 114. In the context of a 
suggestion that the Commonwealth’s power should be only to ‘admit’ new states, 
rather than to also ‘establish’ new states, delegates entertained the division of 
																																																								
40 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Adelaide, 20 April 1897, 1010 
(Edmund Barton). 
41 Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Sydney, 13 September 
1897, 402. 
42 Ibid 403. 
43 Ibid. In addition, delegates were concerned not to ‘prevent the subdivision of … colonies in the 
near future’ and not to ‘continue the large and unwieldly [sic] character of these colonies’: at 405 
(William McMillan). 
44 Ibid 415; see Williams, above n 17, 766. 
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Queensland into three parts prior to Federation, and its entry into the 
Commonwealth as three separate states. Higgins supported the amendment in 
saying that ‘if Queensland were divided into three colonies before the people … 
applied for admission to the Federation, it would be quite a false statement to say 
that the Federal Commonwealth establishes those three colonies’.45 
The division of Queensland prior to Federation was again adverted to 
during discussion of a proposal to remove from cl 114 the Commonwealth’s power 
to determine the extent of representation of a new state in the Commonwealth 
Parliament. Advocating a principle of equal state representation in the Senate, John 
Cockburn, Member of the South Australian House of Assembly, argued that ‘if 
Queensland enters the Federation as a whole, or as more than one state, each new 
state should enter upon the same terms in respect of representation’.46 Later, in 
connection with the same amendment, the question ‘[i]s it intended … to allow the 
Parliament of the Commonwealth to carve new states out of existing states?’47 was 
met with the affirmation ‘that must be the intention’.48 Although these proposed 
amendments to cl 114 were defeated,49 the debate provides a further example of 
how the framers of the Constitution expected the creation of new states out of the 
existing Australian states. 
The delegates also debated for the first time a provision (cl 117) requiring 
the consent of state parliaments for the formation of a new state from their 
territory. James Walker, a New South Wales delegate and former resident of 
Queensland, argued that any requirement of state parliament consent was an 
obstacle to Queensland’s entry into the Federation, stating that: 
at the present time the colony may be sub-divided upon petition to Her 
Majesty the Queen, and a large proportion of the people there are afraid to 
come under a Constitution which might take away Her Majesty’s 
prerogative in this respect, and prevent any division of the colony without 
the consent of the state Parliament. That was really the reason why the 
Queensland Federal Bill was not passed.50 
He proposed an additional provision modifying the requirement of state parliament 
consent by way of preserving the Monarch’s power of subdivision in the case of 
Queensland.51 However, delegates were unwilling to alienate the majority of 
electors in southern Queensland, who were opposed to separatism,52 and so the 
																																																								
45 Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 8 February 
1898, 696 (Henry Higgins). See also the suggestion that ‘instead of the colony of Queensland, three 
other colonies, although embracing the same territorial area as Queensland … can be admitted to 
the Federation under the provision allowing the Parliament to establish new states’: at 694–5 
(Edmund Barton). 
46 Ibid 696 (John Cockburn). 
47 Ibid 697 (Charles Kingston). 
48 Ibid 697 (Edmund Barton). 
49 Ibid 696, 698. 
50 Ibid 697 (James Walker). 
51 Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 1 March 1898, 
1690 (James Walker). 
52 Ibid 1697, 1699 (Edmund Barton), 1701 (Richard O’Connor), 1702 (Henry Dobson). 
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resolution was withdrawn and later negatived.53 Suggestions that such a provision 
be made to apply to all colonies entering into the Federation were also dismissed.54 
Nonetheless, the lengthy consideration the proposal was given highlights the 
seriousness with which the delegates viewed the possibility that new states would 
be carved out of Queensland.55 More generally, delegates envisaged the formation 
of new states out of existing states as a natural step in the development of the 
Commonwealth. From this it is clear that the new states provisions of the 
Constitution were not intended as contingency provisions, but as mechanisms for 
dealing with anticipated changes to the structure of the Federation. 
III Creation of New States from the Existing States 
In the Constitution that came into force in 1901, the creation of new states from the 
existing Australian states is governed by ss 121 and 124. These provisions were 
formulated early in the series of constitutional conventions. Chapter VI cls 1 and 2 
of the draft Constitution from the 1891 National Australasian Convention, 
amended and reduced to a single clause at the first session of the 1897–98 National 
Australasian Convention, form s 121.56 Chapter VI cl 5 of the draft Constitution 
from the 1891 National Australasian Convention forms s 124.57 
Section 121 confers on the Commonwealth Parliament the power to make 
new states and to impose terms and conditions on their admission or establishment: 
121. New States may be admitted or established 
The Parliament may admit to the Commonwealth or establish new States, 
and may upon such admission or establishment make or impose such terms 
and conditions, including the extent of representation in either House of the 
Parliament, as it thinks fit. 
Section 124 does not constitute a fresh grant of power, but imposes an 
additional requirement on certain exercises of power under s 121,58 namely, the 
consent of the relevant state parliament or parliaments: 
124. Formation of new States 
A new State may be formed by separation of territory from a State, but only 
with the consent of the Parliament thereof, and a new State may be formed 
																																																								
53 Ibid 1702 (James Walker); Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, 
Melbourne, 11 March 1898, 2400. 
54 Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Melbourne, 1 March 1898, 
1692 (Charles Kingston), 1692 (Alfred Deakin). 
55 Discussion occupied some 15 pages over several days. 
56 Quick and Garran, above n 33, 967–8. In the draft Constitution from the first session of the  
1897–98 National Australasian Convention ch VI cl 2 was renumbered cl 114. In the draft 
Constitution from the third session of the 1897–98 National Australasian Convention cl 114 was 
renumbered cl 120 and minor modifications were made to its phrasing: Williams, above n 17, 608, 
791, 1139. 
57 Quick and Garran, above n 33, 976. In the draft Constitution from the first session of the 1897–98 
National Australasian Convention ch VI cl 5 was renumbered cl 117. In the draft Constitution from 
the third session of the 1897–98 National Australasian Convention, cl 117 was renumbered cl 123 
and minor modifications were also made to its phrasing: Williams, above n 17, 609, 791, 1140. 
58 Quick and Garran, above n 33, 976–7. 
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by the union of two or more States or parts of States, but only with the 
consent of the Parliaments of the States affected. 
Sections 121 and 124 prescribe the mechanics of new state formation and 
apparently outline a relatively straightforward process for the creation of new 
states from the existing Australian states.59 Despite this, the 1988 Constitutional 
Commission criticised these provisions, suggesting that ‘[t]he wording of 
[ss 121 and 124] has given rise to considerable doubt and difficulty both as to 
their precise meaning, and as to their application to the various ways in which 
potential new States may originate’.60 In particular, s 121 does not detail the 
extent of the Commonwealth Parliament’s power to impose terms and 
conditions on the formation of a new state. Consequently, there is uncertainty as 
to the scope for the Commonwealth Parliament to determine the representation 
and structure of a new state. 
A Formation of New States 
Under ss 121 and 124 of the Constitution, the formation of a new state requires the 
consent of both the Commonwealth Parliament and the affected state parliaments. 
In practical terms, the consent of the affected state parliaments would be set out in 
legislation, after which the Commonwealth Parliament would pass legislation 
creating the new state and imposing any terms and conditions.61 
A question has arisen as to whether this process could be affected by the 
terms of s 123 of the Constitution.62 It provides: 
123. Alteration of limits of States 
The Parliament of the Commonwealth may, with the consent of the 
Parliament of a State, and the approval of the majority of the electors of the 
State voting upon the question, increase, diminish, or otherwise alter the 
limits of the State, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed on, and 
may, with the like consent, make provision respecting the effect and 
operation of any increase or diminution or alteration of territory in relation 
to any State affected.  
The formation of a new state from an existing state would necessarily diminish or 
alter the territory of the existing state. If such a diminution or alteration attracts the 
operation of s 123, a successful referendum would be an additional prerequisite to 
the creation of a new state from an existing state. 
The matter has not been judicially considered, but the preferable view is 
that s 123 does not impose a condition on the formation of new states additional to 
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those contained in ss 121 and 124. The word ‘may’ in the opening phrase of s 123 
shows that the provision grants an additional power, rather than limiting any 
existing power.63 The lack of reference to ss 121 and 124 also suggests that s 123 
does not qualify their operation.64 Additionally, s 123 is best considered as being 
directed at modifying state boundaries, rather than creating new states.65  
The chapter heading ‘New States’ might imply that each section in ch VI concerns 
new states, and that each section in ch VI is applicable to new states. However, the 
presence of s 122, which covers only the government of territories, makes it clear 
that the sections in ch VI affect matters outside of the formation of new states.66  
It follows that s 123 does not constrain the operation of ss 121 and 124. 
This conclusion is consistent with the case law on the relationship between 
s 123 and other sections of the Constitution. In Paterson v O’Brien,67 the High 
Court examined the nexus between ss 123 and 111 — the latter section allowing a 
state parliament to surrender state territory to the Commonwealth.68 The High 
Court held unanimously that the surrender of state territory under s 111 was not 
affected by s 123, and that a referendum was therefore not necessary.69 The 
reasoning in Paterson v O’Brien is equally applicable to the relationship between 
ss 123 and 124,70 thereby providing strong support for the view that a referendum 
is not a constitutional requirement for the formation of a new state out of the 
territory of an existing state. 
B Representation of New States 
In creating new states, the Commonwealth Parliament may impose such terms and 
conditions as it thinks fit in respect of the extent of representation of the new state in 
either house of the Commonwealth Parliament. Although original states have a right 
to equal representation and a minimum of six representatives in the Senate pursuant 
to s 7 of the Constitution, covering cl 6 distinguishes between ‘Original States’, 
which are ‘such States as are parts of the Commonwealth at its establishment’, and 
‘States’, which are ‘parts of the Commonwealth, and such colonies or territories as 
may be admitted into or established by the Commonwealth as States’.71 As a result, 
new states are not entitled to equal representation or a minimum of six 
representatives in the Senate. Their representation in the Senate is subject to the 
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Theoretically at least, there is no upper limit on how many senators may 
represent a new state. Indeed, new states might be given significantly greater 
representation than the original states. However, this is not a politically plausible 
outcome given that it would require the consent of both houses of the existing 
Parliament. As Mason J stated in Western Australia v Commonwealth,73 in 
dismissing ‘the grim spectre … of a Parliament swamping the Senate with senators 
from the Territories’, the significance of this concern is: 
diminished when it is appreciated that the Constitution provides no 
safeguard against the pursuit by Parliament of a similar course at the 
expense of the original States in allowing for the representation of new 
States in the Senate. Although s 7 provides that equal representation of the 
original States shall be maintained in that chamber, neither the section nor 
the remaining provisions of Pt II of Ch I place any restriction on the number 
of senators which Parliament may accord to a new State as its representation 
in the Senate … [T]he assumption is that Parliament will act responsibly.74 
When it comes to the House of Representatives, s 24 of the Constitution 
provides that the House of Representatives must include at least five members 
chosen in each ‘Original State’, meaning that there is no guarantee of minimum 
representation in respect of new states.75 That section also provides that the 
‘number of members chosen in the several States shall be in proportion to the 
respective numbers of their people’.76 This part of the section, which does not refer 
specifically to the original states,77 has not been the subject of interpretation by the 
High Court. 
The High Court held in the First Territories Representation Case78 and 
Queensland v Commonwealth79 that the Commonwealth Parliament’s power to 
make laws for the territories and to allow the representation of territories as it sees 
fit, pursuant to s 122, qualifies the operation of s 24. It might be argued that s 121 
also qualifies the operation of s 24 so that the principle of proportional 
representation in the lower house does not apply in the case of new states.80 
However, differences in the wording of ss 121 and 122 suggest that the 
decisions in the First and Second Territories Representation Cases would not be 
followed in the case of new states. Section 121 allows the Commonwealth to ‘impose 
terms and conditions, including as to the extent of representation, as it thinks fit’ on 
new states, while s 122 enables the Commonwealth to ‘allow the representation of 
such territory in either House of the Parliament to the extent and on the terms which 
it thinks fit’. The Commonwealth’s power to determine the representation of new 
states is thus narrower than its power in relation to territories (in that the former 
implies that there will be representation, and only allows the Commonwealth to 
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determine its extent). This difference provides one basis upon which to distinguish 
the High Court’s decisions in regard to the territories and s 24.81 
Additionally, if proportional representation was not the applicable formula 
for new states in the House of Representatives, then s 24 could have provided for 
this by stating that ‘[t]he number of members chosen in the several Original States 
shall be in proportion to the respective numbers of their people’. Expecting such an 
explicit reference is reasonable given that s 24 elsewhere refers to the Original 
States in the context of their minimum representation in the House of 
Representatives. All this suggests that new states are entitled to proportional 
representation in the House of Representatives. 
While the Commonwealth Parliament exercises power over the 
representation of a new state, especially in the Senate, it could not deny a new state 
representation. Members of the High Court have emphasised the constitutional 
requirement that all states have some form of representation in both houses of 
parliament. In the First Territories Representation Case, Barwick CJ contrasted 
the Commonwealth’s capacity to determine the ‘extent of representation’ or the 
‘numerical strength of the representation’ pursuant to s 121, with the fact that some 
form of representation must occur.82 Echoing Barwick CJ’s reasoning, Aicken J in 
the Second Territories Representation Case noted that the Commonwealth 
Parliament could not establish a new state without any senators or members of the 
House of Representatives.83 His assertion that according to s 121, ‘it is only the 
“extent”, and not the fact or mode, of representation which is committed to the 
Parliament’84 makes clear that the Commonwealth could not make it a condition of 
the admission or establishment of a new state that its representation be set at zero.85 
C Extent of Commonwealth Power 
The Commonwealth Parliament has a wide power to impose terms and conditions on 
the formation of new states relating to subjects other than representation.86 Indeed, 
the power in s 121 is apparently unfettered in stating that the Commonwealth may 
‘make or impose such terms and conditions … as it thinks fit’. These terms and 
conditions are most likely to be expressed in the new state’s constitution, such as in 
relation to the protection of minorities, the extent of its franchise and the process of 
amendment of the constitution. Ultimately, the terms and conditions imposed on the 
formation of a new state will be a political matter, determined through negotiations 
between the Commonwealth Parliament, representatives of the new state and the 
existing state from which it has been drawn.87 
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The Commonwealth’s power to impose conditions may appear to be 
unlimited, but this does not bear up under scrutiny. If nothing else, this power may 
only be exercised under s 121 ‘upon such admission or establishment’ of the new 
state, and so may only be used to impose terms and conditions at that time.88  
No further conditions may be imposed once a new state has joined the Federation. 
Additionally, it is axiomatic that any terms and conditions must not be 
incompatible with the Constitution itself.89 Hence, no condition could amount to a 
breach of the requirement in s 92 of the Constitution that interstate trade and 
commerce shall be ‘absolutely free’, or in s 117 that people not be subject to a 
disability or discrimination on the basis of their state residence. Moreover, s 121 
only enables the Commonwealth to admit or establish a ‘state’, so if the terms and 
conditions imposed take the entity beyond that definition, the terms and conditions 
will be ineffective. This reflects the fact that the Commonwealth is unable to alter 
the fundamental constitutional concept of a ‘state’ in s 121. It may only admit or 
establish entities that answer that description. 
The idea that the Constitution mandates certain immutable constitutional 
concepts is evident in a number of recent High Court decisions. For example, in 
Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales, the High Court recognised that each 
state must possess a body fitting the description of a Supreme Court.90 Based on 
the mention of the ‘Supreme Court of a State’ in s 73 of the Constitution, 
French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ found that ‘[i]t is 
beyond the legislative power of a State so to alter the constitution or character of 
its Supreme Court that it ceases to meet the constitutional description’.91 It was 
stated that the constitutional description of a state Supreme Court includes its 
supervisory jurisdiction to grant relief on the ground of jurisdictional error in 
respect of a decision by an inferior court or tribunal.92 As a result, a privative 
clause was ineffective to prevent review of a decision of the Industrial Court by the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales. 
By parity of reasoning, since the power conferred on the Commonwealth 
Parliament by s 121 only relates to ‘states’, the purported creation of a political 
entity that departed from the constitutional concept of a ‘state’ could not be 
effective under that section.93 The High Court has not been called upon to consider 
what the word ‘state’ means in this context, nor what are its essential 
characteristics. One aspect, though, that is clear is that a new state could not be 
created unless it possessed a judicial system that complied with the Constitution. 
Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission shows that any attempt to create a state, 
whether by way of a Commonwealth condition or otherwise, requiring the absence 
of a judiciary would be ineffective due to the constitutional requirement that the 
state at least possess a Supreme Court in conformity with s 73 of the Constitution. 
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Is it is also questionable whether a new state could be created without a 
parliament. It is likely to be implicit in the concept of statehood that the entity 
possesses self-government, and hence a legislature of some kind. The capacity of 
every state to make laws is reflected in a number of sections in the Constitution, 
such as s 109 dealing with inconsistency between state and federal laws. As a 
result, a new entity that possessed no lawmaking capacity, and instead perhaps was 
subject to the condition that all laws for the state to were to be made for it by the 
Commonwealth, would likely not answer the description of a ‘state’. 
Similarly, a condition imposing a federal veto over all laws made by the 
new state parliament may not comply with the terms of s 121. It might be that the 
Constitution not only entails that the states are self-governing, but that they possess 
a level of autonomy from the Commonwealth. This is consistent with the obiter 
dicta of members of the High Court in other contexts, such as in developing an 
implied immunity of the states from certain federal laws. For example, in 
Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth, Dixon J said ‘[t]he foundation of the 
Constitution is the conception of a central government and a number of State 
governments separately organized. The Constitution predicates their continued 
existence as independent entities’.94 If obiter dicta such as this were applied and 
extended, it might give rise to a significant limit on s 121. 
IV Attempts to Create New States from the Existing States 
In the period since Federation, there has been strong support for the creation of 
new states in the New England, Riverina and Monaro regions of New South Wales, 
and in Queensland. These movements echo pre-Federation calls for the formation 
of separate colonies95 in northern New South Wales from the 1840s,96 and the 
Riverina97 and Queensland from the 1850s.98 The movement in New England made 
the most progress towards achieving a new state when a referendum in 1967 asking 
electors whether they supported the creation of a new state in northern New South 
Wales was narrowly defeated. The history of such attempts reveals that political 
factors can be a significant barrier to the attainment of parliamentary consent 
required by ss 121 and 124 of the Constitution. For example, although a successful 
referendum is not a constitutional requirement for the formation of a new state, the 
history of new state movements reveals that parliaments are unlikely to support the 
creation of a new state in the absence of a clear political mandate provided by a 
referendum. The history also demonstrates that sufficient popular support for this 
purpose can be difficult to attain. 
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A New England 
1 Origins of the Post-Federation New State Movement, 1915–25 
Support for the creation of a new state in northern New South Wales following 
Federation originated in rural discontent, manifested in 1915 in Grafton, in 
response to the cutting of ferry services.99 Concern at the cessation of public 
transport reflected the perception that the interests of rural communities were 
marginalised by government decisions made in the interests of Sydney and other 
urban areas.100 The post-Federation movement for a new state in New England 
began in earnest in early 1920 in Tamworth when proponents of the Grafton 
separation movement encouraged the editor of a local newspaper, Victor 
Thompson, to publish a series of editorials advocating the formation of a new 
state.101 Thompson’s newspaper campaign promoted the establishment of a new 
state as a solution to depopulation and decline in rural areas.102 Subsequently, 
Thompson and other newspaper proprietors in New England formed a New State 
Press League and a Press Propaganda Executive, which sought to raise the profile 
of the issue.103 
Momentum for new states came also from outside the local press, when 
‘New State Leagues’ and a Central Executive formed in late 1920.104 
Representatives of the various New State Leagues attended conventions 
coordinated by the Central Executive. The inaugural convention in 1921 comprised 
220 delegates from 124 New State Leagues,105 highlighting the grassroots 
character of the movement. The Convention’s aim was to work towards the 
formation of an independent state in northern New South Wales.106 A proposal to 
determine the boundaries of the new state was abandoned in the interests of 
avoiding disagreement.107 However, the Convention resolved to gain the New 
South Wales Parliament’s consent to separation, pursuant to s 121 of the 
Australian Constitution, through presentation of a petition following a procession 
through Sydney.108 The Convention also affirmed the desirability of holding a 
federal convention aimed at amending s 124 of the Australian Constitution to 
remove the requirement of state parliament consent to the formation of a new 
state.109 In this way, the movement adopted a two-pronged strategy, aimed at the 
state parliament on one hand, and the Australian Constitution on the other.110 
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Members of the new state movement travelled to Sydney where they 
addressed meetings and precipitated the formation of a further, Sydney-based New 
State League.111 In response to public opinion, and after persistent lobbying, the 
New South Wales Legislative Assembly passed a motion in 1922 calling for the 
establishment of a federal convention to consider the question of a separate state in 
northern New South Wales.112 At the time, George Fuller’s Nationalist 
Government was in power in the state, though the resolution itself was introduced 
as a private member’s bill.113 On receiving the resolution, Prime Minister Stanley 
Bruce instructed that the New South Wales Parliament first affirm the desirability 
of a new state, the terms of separation, and the allocation of debts and assets 
between the existing state and the new state.114 Only then, and with the consent of 
the Federal Parliament, would the Commonwealth Government, ‘take whatever 
steps are necessary to give effect to the wishes of the Parliament and the people of 
New South Wales’.115 
Subsequently, in 1923, the New South Wales Legislative Assembly passed 
a resolution creating a royal commission to consider the formation new states in 
New England, the Riverina and the Monaro.116 The Commission was established 
with broad terms of reference117 and collected evidence from over 500 witnesses in 
the course of a year.118 In 1925, the Commission reported that it was: 
unanimously of opinion that in its original form the proposal for the creation 
of a new State in the northern part of New South Wales is neither practicable 
nor desirable. With the exception of Mr Commissioner Sinclair [a New 
England grazier], we are also of opinion that in any amended form a 
proposal for the creation of a new State is neither practicable nor desirable 
… We are also unanimously of opinion that the proposals for the creation of 
new States in the Riverina and the Monaro, in either their original or in any 
amended form, are neither practicable nor desirable.119 
The proposed new states were considered unsuitable primarily for economic 
reasons. The Commission found that forming new states would increase the costs 
of government and taxation rates, while the regions would not operate as economic 
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units.120 Political disagreements between proponents of the movement121 and deep 
disputes over state boundaries were also put forward as obstacles to the formation 
of a new state in New England.122 As a result, the Commission instead 
recommended that increased administrative efficiency and powers of 
self-government ‘can be adequately secured by the adoption of the scheme for the 
extension of Local Government’.123 The conclusions of the Commission were 
criticised as understating the widespread support for the new states movement and 
as being ‘contrary to fact and evidence’.124 Unsurprisingly, the Commission’s 
recommendations stalled the movement for a new state in New England.125 
2 Gaining Momentum, 1925–35 
After the Commission’s findings, the new state movement then shifted its focus to 
the Commonwealth, urging an amendment to s 124 of the Constitution that would 
allow the formation of new states without state parliament consent. After 
Thompson had made unsuccessful deputations to Prime Minister Bruce, and after 
two motions calling for a referendum to change s 124 had been defeated in the 
Commonwealth Parliament, the Bruce–Page Government appointed a royal 
commission in 1927 to inquire into a range of proposed constitutional 
amendments.126 When this royal commission reported in 1929, the majority 
recommended that the Constitution be amended to provide a means for the 
formation of new states based on popular support as an alternative to the 
requirement of state parliament consent in s 124. However, this recommendation 
fell by the wayside after the Bruce–Page Government lost power later in 1929.127 
Returning to the state sphere, in 1933 the New South Wales Government 
appointed a further royal commission to inquire into areas suitable for 
self-government as states.128 The Commission was appointed to fulfil an election 
promise made by United Australia Party Premier Sir Bertram Stevens and Michael 
Bruxner, the leader of his Country Party coalition partner.129 Unlike the 1925 
Royal Commission, it was not asked to consider the desirability of the formation of 
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new states, but only the suitability of areas in New South Wales for this purpose.130 
Reporting in 1935, the Commission found two areas suitable for self-government. 
The first was a triangular area in northern New South Wales bounded by the 
Queensland border in the north, Lake Macquarie in the south-east and the north-
western corner of New South Wales. The second was comprised of central, 
western and southern regions of New South Wales.131 
The Commission recommended that a referendum be held in each proposed 
new state, starting with the area in northern New South Wales, after electors had 
been informed of the advantages and disadvantages of the creation of a new 
state.132 The attainment of some level of consensus on the new state issue was 
significant, and indicates that consensus can be achieved. Despite the 
Commission’s findings, there was no immediate move to hold a referendum in 
either location. This hiatus reflected the poor economic conditions of the Great 
Depression and the onset of the Second World War.133 
3 Representation and Referendum, 1948–67 
Following a period of inactivity, the New England new state movement revived in 
1948, seeking self-government in the area of northern New South Wales 
pronounced suitable by the 1935 Royal Commission. The new state movement 
persistently lobbied the New South Wales Legislative Council from 1949 by 
petition and deputation, but without success.134 During this time, the representative 
character of the movement strengthened.135 This was reflected in the unofficial new 
state poll conducted by 21 councils, concurrently with local government elections in 
1953, in which 77% of electors supported the formation of a New England state.136 
The movement also established representative institutions for a New 
England state in 1954, and in 1955 a representative assembly — the New England 
Constituent Assembly — first sat at Armidale.137 Modified parliamentary processes 
were adopted and the Assembly had self-conferred powers to conduct a 
referendum, organise an election and pass its own Acts.138 Although the Assembly 
lacked the legal authority to enforce its decisions, its processes enabled it to 
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request that an Act be given effect by the New South Wales Parliament.139 The 
Assembly passed bills calling for the formation of a new state in New England and 
the creation of a development corporation to promote industries and investment.140 
The former was referred to the Premier of New South Wales for introduction into 
the New South Wales Parliament.141 
Subsequently, the New South Wales Parliament, headed by Liberal Premier 
Robert Askin, passed the New States Referendum Act 1966 (NSW), authorising a 
referendum in the area in northern New South Wales identified by the 1935 Royal 
Commission.142 As in 1922–23 and 1933, support for a new state in northern New 
South Wales came from the conservative side of politics. The referendum aimed 
‘to find out whether the people in this particular part of New South Wales wish to 
have a separate State government of their own’.143 It was anticipated that if the 
referendum was successful, the government would assist the people of northern 
New South Wales to form a new state.144 However, a new state would be 
conditional on the resolution of ‘constitutional and economic questions involved 
between the new State, the State of New South Wales and the Commonwealth of 
Australia’ after a process of detailed and thorough investigation.145 Thus, a 
successful referendum was considered not to be determinative, but a preliminary 
step in the creation of a new state and a basis for further investigation. 
On 29 April 1967, electors in the proposed northern state were asked ‘[a]re 
you in favour of the establishment of a new State in north-east New South Wales 
as described in Schedule One to the New State Referendum Act, 1966?’146 The 
referendum was defeated with 168 103 votes in favour of the proposal, or 46%, 
and 198 812 votes against, or 54%.147 The failure of the referendum has been 
attributed to its reliance on the area selected by the 1935 Royal Commission, in 
particular, the inclusion of Newcastle.148 The inclusion of Newcastle in the 
boundaries of the proposed new state contributed to the defeat of the referendum in 
two ways. First, it created a ‘no’ vote outside of Newcastle associated with 
concerns that Newcastle would dominate the new state, and that a state centred on 
Newcastle would not accord sufficient weight to the interests of northern, rural 
regions. Second, Newcastle and its surrounds returned a high ‘no’ vote. Where in 
northern electorates the ‘yes’ vote amounted to 66.6%, it was as low as 28% in 
Newcastle. Support for a new state in the nearby Gloucester and Manning dairying 
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In the weeks following the unsuccessful referendum, the New England new 
state movement adopted a revised proposal for boundaries of a new state that 
excluded areas returning a majority ‘no’ vote. The movement in northern New 
South Wales then disbanded.150 As anticipated in the second reading speech for the 
New States Referendum Act 1966 (NSW), the failure of the referendum led to the 
new state proposal being shelved.151 This decline coincided with weakening 
support for the new states movement from the Country Party, formerly its greatest 
advocate in the political sphere. Although the Askin–Cutler Government secured a 
referendum, they anticipated that it would fail due to the inclusion of Newcastle in 
the proposed state and did little to further the cause.152 They also declined to 
consider the New England new state movement’s proposal with revised 
boundaries. More broadly, the trend towards economic and political centralisation 
in the ‘era of development’ of the 1950s and 1960s was inimical to decentralising 
reforms such as the formation of new states.153 
Since, there have been occasional echoes of the long-running campaign in 
Northern New South Wales, most recently, Joyce’s calls for a new state in New 
England as a component of National Party policy. In doing so, Joyce recalled that 
‘[g]rowing up … I was acutely aware of the 1967 referendum for a new state’.154 
B Other New State Movements 
1 Riverina 
As in New England, calls for the creation of a new state in the Riverina in 
south-western New South Wales resurfaced in the decades following Federation. 
Inhabitants of the Riverina sought to redress the neglect of country areas that had 
followed the centralisation of government services.155 There were also concerns 
that revenue generated by the Riverina was spent elsewhere, and that freight 
charges for the Riverina were unfair.156 While the Riverina initially sought union 
with Victoria, at a conference at Albury in 1921 it resolved to focus its energies on 
separation from New South Wales.157 Under the leadership of E J Gorman, the 
Riverina New State League was formed, comprised of committees at Narrandera 
and Wagga, along with 13 groups focused on towns in the Riverina. 
The Riverina New State League intersected with other new state 
movements through its participation at the All-Australia Convention at Albury in 
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1922.158 The Convention, attended by representatives from new state movements in 
New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia, was a forum for 
discussion of constitutional reforms including the provision of a simplified process 
for the division of existing states.159 The Riverina New State League also adopted a 
proposal for state boundaries at Wagga in 1923,160 and many of its members gave 
evidence to the 1925 Royal Commission. The Commission’s recommendation 
against the creation of a new state in the Riverina brought an end to the campaign 
of the Riverina New State League.161 
Agitation for a new state in the Riverina resurfaced in 1931 as the Riverina 
Movement, headed by Charles Hardy Junior.162 This second stage of the movement 
for separation from New South Wales was more loosely organised.163 Notable 
achievements included a rally on the riverbank of Wagga attended by 10 000 
supporters and the presentation of a petition with 30 000 signatures to the 
Commonwealth Government in 1931.164 However, the Riverina Movement was 
short-lived, ending in 1935.165 Unlike the New England movement, advocates of a 
new state in the Riverina never introduced institutions for self-government or 
attained a referendum. 
2 Monaro 
Support for the creation of a new state in the Monaro in south-eastern New South 
Wales developed as an offshoot of the Riverina New States League. At the 
All-Australia Convention in 1922, the South Coast League began its own 
movement for the creation of a new state.166 While the movement was 
geographically focused on the Monaro, it advocated the need for subdivision, not 
only in the Monaro, but also in other areas of Australia, through its propaganda 
published in the Goulburn Penny Post.167 Like the New England new state 
movement and the Riverina New States League, the Monaro new state movement 
was organised in leagues in prominent towns, namely Goulburn and Bombala.168 
The Monaro movement was dissolved following the unfavourable conclusions of 
the 1925 Royal Commission.169 	  
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3 Queensland 
Interest in the subdivision of Queensland was strong prior to Federation.170 
However, the push for change failed to generate significant momentum after that 
time, at least as compared to the long-running movements in New South Wales. 
The Queensland new state movements were driven by concerns that Queensland’s 
northern regions could not be governed effectively from Brisbane on the southern 
boundary, and a desire for an expansion of local autonomy in the northern and 
central areas of Queensland.171 In 1910, the Queensland Legislative Assembly 
passed a resolution that Queensland be divided into Northern Queensland centred 
on Townsville, Central Queensland centred on Rockhampton and Southern 
Queensland centred on Brisbane.172 However, no further action was taken,173 in 
part reflecting the disorganised approach of the Queensland Country Party, which 
championed the issue at this time.174 
Parallel to the resurgence of the new state movement in New England, the 
Queensland Governor stated at the opening of the Queensland Parliament in 1948 
that new states might be formed when they had a ‘reasonable degree of financial 
and economic stability’.175 A new state movement gained pace in Queensland in 
1955,176 with the New State for North Queensland Movement launched at a 
popular convention at Mareeba, near Cairns that year. Although a Country 
Party-led coalition sympathetic to the new states cause gained power in 
Queensland in 1957, Frank Nicklin, the head of government, declared the 
formation of new states too difficult.177 Supporters of a new state continued to push 
for a referendum until the 1970s, when the movement faded from view,178 much as 
it had in New South Wales. 
V Reform Proposals 
Parallel to the history of attempts to create new states from the existing states, the new 
states provisions of the Constitution have been examined by three Commonwealth 
reviews. They have produced recommendations for amending the Constitution so that 
a new state can be formed without the consent of the relevant state parliament or 
parliaments when there are high levels of popular support in the proposed state and the 
affected state or states as a whole. Such recommendations recognise the difficulty of 
securing the consent of state parliaments and reflect the framers’ intention that the 
Constitution provide an effective and workable mechanism for the formation of new 
states. No recommendation of this kind has been put to a referendum. 
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A Commonwealth Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1929 
The first Commonwealth review to consider the new states provisions was the 
Royal Commission on the Constitution, reporting in 1929. The Commission was 
charged with inquiring into Commonwealth power under the Constitution and the 
workings of the Constitution since Federation, with a view to recommending 
desirable constitutional changes.179 It recommended ‘that an alternative method of 
creating new States should be provided in the Constitution so that in a proper case 
a new State may be created out of an existing State without the consent of the State 
Parliament’.180 
The Commission viewed popular support as an appropriate alternative basis 
for the creation of a new state. It emphasised that a proposal for a new state should 
attract popular support not only in the area of the new state, but also in the affected 
state as a whole, as people in the proposed new state and the state as a whole are 
‘vitally interested’.181 As such, the Commission suggested that a new s 124A be 
inserted in the Constitution, providing for the formation of a new state from an 
existing state where a majority of electors in the territory of the new state and in 
the existing state approve the proposed establishment of the new state.182 
Recognising the difficulty of attaining majority support for the proposal in the 
existing state, s 124A would also allow the formation of a new state where the 
proposal was supported by three-fifths of the electors in the territory of the new 
state and two-fifths of electors in the existing state.183 
Additionally, s 124A set out the process that would lead to the two 
referendums. A proposal for the establishment of a new state would be initiated by 
a petition to the Commonwealth Parliament signed by one-fifth of the electors in 
the territory of the proposed new state, provided the territory of the proposed new 
state was not smaller than that of Tasmania. The Commonwealth Parliament would 
have the power to appoint a commission to determine the boundaries of the 
proposed new state, having regard to ‘the boundaries mentioned in the petition, 
community of interest, physical features, existing boundaries of States, and other 
relevant matters’.184 A convention of elected representatives from the territory of 
the new state would then approve the state boundaries and frame a constitution. An 
inquiry would also be held into matters such as the circumstances of the new state 
and the value of assets to be transferred to it.185 
The section would empower the Commonwealth Parliament: to 
determine the manner in which the petition would be presented; to define the 
limits of the new state; to prescribe the terms and conditions on which the new 
state would be established; to provide for a convention; to prescribe the manner 
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in which the new state questions would be presented to electors; and to establish 
the new state if the establishment of the state is approved. It also required that 
the new state be proclaimed within two years after a successful referendum is 
held.186 Section 124 would be retained, with minor amendments for consistency 
with the new s 124A.187 
The seven members of the Commission agreed with the central 
recommendation that the Constitution should provide for a new state to be created, 
on the basis of popular support, without the consent of the state parliament.188 
However, there was some discord as to the detail of the proposed s 124A. The 
Chairman, John Peden, and Sir Hal Colebatch rejected the recommendation that 
the Commonwealth Parliament have the power to create a new state,189 despite a 
majority of electors in the whole state voting against the proposal. Mr Duffy and 
Mr McNamara viewed the specification on the minimum area of a state as too 
restrictive.190 
B Commonwealth Joint Committee on Constitutional Review, 
1959 
Thirty years later, the Commonwealth Joint Committee on Constitutional Review 
considered the new states provisions, in the context of a broad review of the 
Constitution. Like the 1929 Royal Commission, the Joint Committee saw the 
requirement of state parliament consent in s 124 as ‘a barrier to the formation of 
new States from the territory of an existing State’.191 It noted that although 
parliaments represent democracy in Australia, ‘it is no less consistent with 
democracy that the people of a State should be able to express themselves directly 
on such questions as the formation of a new area of government’.192 Accordingly, 
it recommended amending the Constitution so that the Commonwealth Parliament 
would have the power to form a new state by the separation of territory from a 
state or the union of two or more states or parts of states ‘if a majority of electors 
in the area of the proposed State and a majority of electors in the whole State … 
vote in favour of the formation of the proposed State’.193 As with the 1929 
recommendation, this would provide an alternative to the requirement of the 
consent of the affected state parliament in s 124. 
This recommendation did not go as far as that of the 1929 Royal 
Commission. Rather, the Joint Committee criticised the 1929 Royal 
Commission’s support for the creation of a new state in circumstances where the 
proposal did not attain the approval of the majority of electors in the state as a 
whole, adopting the minority view of Peden and Colebatch.194 The Joint 
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Committee considered the approval of the majority of electors in the state as a 
whole as necessary to give effect to the legitimate interest of electors outside the 
boundaries of the proposed new state, who would be nonetheless affected by its 
creation. This was especially the case since the vote in the state as a whole would 
include the votes of electors in the new state area.195 It pointed to the 
establishment of a new state in an area of particularly rich natural resources or in 
an area including an existing capital city as examples of circumstances that would 
have significant implications for the entire state.196 
Although the Joint Committee conceded the difficulty of attaining support 
for the creation of a new state even by two-fifths of electors in the whole of the 
existing state, it regarded the requirement of majority support appropriate.197 As 
the Joint Committee stated, it ‘doubts whether the formation of a new State, 
contrary to the wishes of majority of electors in the State affected, would afford 
sufficient recognition of the interests of the exiting State’,198 and further, that ‘no 
proposed constitutional alteration should tolerate the abrogation of the interests of 
an existing State’.199 
The Joint Committee envisaged the expansion of the powers of the 
Commonwealth Parliament to allow it to deal effectively with matters related to 
the formation of a new state by popular approval. As such, the Joint Committee 
recommended that the Commonwealth Parliament ‘should have the power to make 
such laws as are necessary to deal with all matters in connexion with the formation 
of a new State’.200 It viewed the ‘detail[ing] of constitutional rules’ inadvisable, 
preferring the maintenance of ‘flexibility’ in view of the uncertainty and lack of 
past experience relating to the formation of new states.201 
C Commonwealth Constitutional Commission, 1988 
The new states provisions were again considered by the Commonwealth 
Constitutional Commission, which reported in 1988. The Commission did not 
consider amending s 124. Rather, it focused on clarifying the operation of s 121 
and its application to the territories, in light of the growing interest surrounding 
Northern Territory statehood. Its recommendations were limited to ‘clarify[ing] 
the ways in which new States may come into existence’ and ‘establish[ing]’ the 
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D Future Reform 
Amending the Constitution in accordance with the key recommendations of the 
1929 Royal Commission and the 1959 Joint Committee would assist in smoothing 
the way for the creation of new states from existing states. The insertion of a new 
provision allowing the creation of new states from existing states where popular 
support is manifested by referenda — in the proposed new state and in the existing 
state as a whole — would complement the requirement for state parliament consent 
in s 124. Such a provision would appropriately widen the circumstances in which a 
new state could be formed. As the 1959 Joint Committee suggested, the democratic 
principle that informs s 124 can be given effect through the decisions of elected 
representatives in a state parliament or directly through the vote of their 
constituents. Arguably, the latter serves as a better reflection of popular will as it is 
unimpeded by political contingencies. And, as the history of attempts to create new 
states indicates, state government disinterest in, or opposition to, proposals to 
create new states can be a significant obstacle. 
Whether the level of popular approval required is a majority of electors in 
the proposed new state and in the existing state as a whole, or some other formula, 
would need to be carefully considered. The recommendations of the 1929 Royal 
Commission and the 1959 Joint Committee offer some guidance, highlighting that 
the interests of electors in the area of a proposed new state would need to be 
weighed against the legitimate interests of the electors in the state as a whole. 
In terms of other aspects of a new provision, the bypass of the state 
parliament would necessitate an expansion of the powers of the Commonwealth in 
relation to the creation of a new state. It remains to be seen whether this would 
pose new challenges for attempts to form new states. A detailed provision like the 
proposed s 124A would provide certainty as to the process for the creation of a 
new state, which may assist with planning by popular movements and by 
governments. However, as the 1959 Joint Committee suggested, a flexible 
approach is preferable given that the formation of new states from existing states 
is, as yet, untested in Australia. The process set out in s 124A nonetheless points to 
important issues to be considered in connection with the formation of a new state 
from an existing state: how such a proposal is to be initiated, how the boundaries 
of the new state will be determined, how its constitution will be drafted and how 
assets will be allocated. 
Such a provision would facilitate the creation of new states from existing 
states in situations in which popular support is not matched by political will. For 
example, in discussions prior to the passage of the New States Referendum Act 
1966 (NSW), the New South Wales Government made no commitment to create 
the proposed new state in northern New South Wales in the event that the 
referendum was successful. If the Constitution provided for popular support as an 
alternative basis for new state formation, and the referendum in northern New 
South Wales and a subsequent referendum in the whole of New South Wales were 
successful, the absence of state parliament consent would not have prevented the 
formation of the new state. The long history of delegations to parliament, 
presentations of bills to parliament, and lobbying of parliament for inquiries and 
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referenda, demonstrates that the support of state parliaments can be difficult to 
attain. This is not to say that attaining broad popular support would be any easier, 
only that it could rightly provide an alternative avenue to the same outcome. 
Given the circumstances in which a new provision would have effect, it 
does not appear that such a change would to this point have led to the creation of a 
new state. The referendum held in northern New South Wales in 1967, the pinnacle 
of new state movements in Australia since Federation, was unsuccessful as only 
46% of electors supported the formation of a new state. Levels of popular support 
for the creation of new states in the Riverina, the Monaro and Queensland — 
where new state movements were smaller in scale and shorter-lived — would 
almost certainly have been even lower. 
It is also doubtful that inserting an alternative basis for creating a new state 
from an existing state based on popular support would lead to the creation of a new 
state in the near future. No effective, organised movement for the creation of a new 
state from an existing state has emerged since the defeat of the referendum in 
northern New South Wales nearly half a century ago. Certainly, there is now only 
limited popular support for the creation of new states. The 2014 Australian 
Constitutional Values Survey reveals that while 71.6% of respondents were in 
favour of reforming the federal system, only 12.4% preferred a system with more 
states.203 The prospects of creating regional governments, abolishing local 
governments or abolishing state governments gained far greater support.204 There 
is a further question as to whether a referendum to change the Constitution to insert 
a new provision would succeed, considering the current limited interest in new 
states and the history of unsuccessful attempts at constitutional reform in 
Australia.205 
VI Conclusion 
The prospect of creating new states out of existing Australian states has a complex 
and dynamic history. The constitutional convention debates of the 1890s reveal 
that the framers of the Constitution viewed the formation of new states in this way 
as being a natural part of the development of the Federation, particularly in the 
case of Queensland. It is therefore unsurprising that the Constitution provides a 
relatively straightforward legal process for the formation of new states. In 
accordance with s 121, new states can be created by the Commonwealth 
Parliament, subject to its broad power to impose terms and conditions including as 
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to the extent of its representation in the Commonwealth Parliament. Under s 124, 
consent to the formation of the new state must be given by the relevant state 
parliament or parliaments. The mechanics of the formation of a new state aside, 
there remains some uncertainty as to the extent of the Commonwealth’s power to 
impose terms and conditions on the representation of new states, and whether a 
purported new state that differed from the existing Australian states in important 
respects would satisfy the constitutional concept of statehood. 
Despite the mostly clear legal path to creating a new state from existing 
states, attempts to bring this about have met with formidable political obstacles. 
Although there is no constitutional requirement for a successful referendum in an 
existing state prior to the creation of a new state from its territory, state parliaments 
are ultimately accountable to their constituents at the ballot box, and are unlikely to 
endorse the creation of a new state unless there is clear evidence that the move has 
broad popular support. Holding a referendum is the most obvious way of 
determining this. However, a referendum can be problematic. As the New England 
referendum of 1967 shows, extending the referendum over an area that exceeds the 
heartland of the popular movement can lead to defeat. Conversely, it is 
questionable whether New England, or similar rural regions, would be 
self-supporting if industrial and metropolitan centres were excluded from the 
proposed new state. 
The difficulties in creating new states from existing states reflects a 
disjunction between the views of the framers of the Constitution in the 1890s, and 
the views of Australian politicians and electors after Federation. While ch VI of the 
Constitution was drafted on the assumption that the creation of new states was 
appropriate and likely, since Federation this view has not been as widely held. 
Contrary to the expectations of its framers, the Australian Federation is often 
perceived to be fixed and unchanging. 
The Constitution should be amended so that popular support for the creation 
of a new state from an existing state, manifested in referenda, provides an 
additional means of forming a new state. This amendment would circumvent the 
problem of political will at the state level that can make s 124 unusable. In light of 
the practical challenges that have emerged, such a change would better reflect the 
framers’ intentions by allowing for the creation of new states when the view that a 
new state is appropriate is held by the public, if not by state parliaments. 
In the short term, the prospect of a popular movement garnering sufficient 
support for the creation of a new state from an existing state is remote. 
Contemporary calls for new states by politicians are not comparable to the strong 
grassroots movements of the 20th century that generated substantial public support 
and collectively gave rise to three royal commissions and a referendum, and were 
still unsuccessful. 
Yet, there is evidence that interest in new states is increasing. The level of 
support for new states recorded in the 2014 Australian Constitutional Values 
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Survey was low, but still at its highest since the survey commenced in 2008,206 
perhaps reflecting public statements made in favour of the idea. In the longer term, 
levels of support for new states may increase substantially. The history of attempts 
to create new states indicates that rural discontent arising from changes such as the 
cutting of transport services, the centralisation of other services and economic 
decline can precipitate grassroots support for change. Amending the Constitution 
to provide an additional path to creating new states could also act as a catalyst for 
new or reinvigorated popular movements of this kind. 
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